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Abstract: We investigate the effects of centrality on cooperation in groups. Players with 
centrality keep a group together by having a pivotal position in a network. In some of our 
experimental treatments, players can vote to exclude others and prevent them from further 
participation in the group. We find that, in the presence of exclusion, central players contribute 
significantly less than others, and that this is tolerated by those others. Because of this 
tolerance, teams with centrality manage to maintain high levels of cooperation.  
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1 Introduction 
Many organizations and groups have some form of network structure defined by who can 
interact with whom. Links between members are often formal. For example, a hierarchical 
chain of command typically creates a well-defined network structure. Network links might, 
however, also be of a more informal nature. Some individuals, for instance, might benefit from 
information provided by others even if these others are not from the same formal organization. 
Think of an employer A looking for suggestions from other employers about suitable 
candidates to recruit (Gërxhani et al. 2013). Even if she is not involved in any formal 
organization connecting her to other employers, A might receive suggestions from employer B 
who happens to be her golf partner. In fact, if B knows employer C, A might even receive 
information from C without knowing C. In this way, some individuals might connect others 
who are otherwise separated. Separation can occur, for instance, by location or lack of direct 
social connections. Individuals who connect others in this way are in a sense more ‘central’ in 
the network than those who do not connect strangers.  
Networks with central players might occur in formal organizations (for example, 
connecting two departments of the same firm), but intuitively, they seem more likely to be 
observed in informal organizations. This is because formal organizations typically try to avoid 
specific individuals becoming too central. Indeed, if distinct subgroups are only connected via 
a central player, then – in both formal and informal networks – her presence is essential for 
these groups to mutually benefit from each other’s actions. In their study of 50 large 
organizations, Cross and Prusak (2002) find that informal networks are ubiquitous, and that 
such networks often have central players who play a crucial role by connecting other 
individuals and subgroups in the organization.  
At the same time, many organizations have mechanisms allowing members to be 
expelled if they somehow fail in their obligations towards other members. An extreme example 
would be how, historically, military personnel would face serious consequences (possibly 
execution) if they shirked on the job. Less dramatic examples of exclusion are observed in 
firms, political parties, supporters groups, and clubs. Managers can be fired, politicians can be 
expelled, hooligans can be banned from visiting games, and club membership can be revoked. 
In some cases, the impact of this exclusion can also be substantial to the group as a whole (e.g. 
a complete government can fall due to the acts of a single politician). A common theme is that 
exclusion from these groups is costly to the person involved and possibly also to the group as 
a whole.  
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When the member’s position is characterized by centrality, however, her exclusion may 
be even more costly to other members of the organization, who are now no longer connected. 
The powerful position that centrality thus brings might then lead central players to exploit their 
pivotal position with little fear of retaliation. Cross and Prusak (2002) find that ‘central 
connectors’ sometimes “use their roles for political or financial gain” (p. 8). The notion of 
centrality is closely related to the idea of structural holes in networks. In our framework a 
central player bridges a structural hole, which enables her to extract the rents from this position 
(Burt 1992; Goyal and Vega-Redondo 2007). This rent seeking is acceptable to those being 
connected because the connections she creates are valuable. It is a price they might well be 
willing to pay, as “it is not easy for the other members of the network to supplant an ineffective 
central connector” (Cross and Prusak 2002, p. 8).  
In this paper, we study how network positions affect cooperative behavior. We design 
an experiment that allows us to study the effects of centrality and how this relates to the 
possibility of excluding players from a network. Our setup creates a network where centrality 
is valuable while cooperation can be enforced by the threat of exclusion. In particular, we 
address the following research questions: (i) How is cooperative behavior affected by being 
central in a network? (ii) How do other players respond to the use or (potential) abuse of a 
central position?  
 In the experiment, subjects play a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) game 
where group members are connected on a network. Payoffs from individual contributions 
accrue to all, without rivalry. As is usual in these games, full contribution by all members is 
efficient but selfish individuals have a dominant strategy to free ride by contributing nothing. 
In one of our treatments, contribution constitutes a public good because no group member can 
be excluded from benefitting. An example is the collection of voluntary contributions amongst 
neighbors, to install safety cameras at the neighborhood’s periphery. In another treatment 
exclusion from group benefits is possible and contributions are best seen as constituting a 
‘quasi’ or ‘impure’ public good (Cornes and Sandler 1996). Here, one can think of 
contributions amongst members of a club to build a new clubhouse, where membership of non-
contributors can be revoked.  
The networks we design provide a formal structure on who can contribute and who 
enjoys the benefits of any individual’s contribution. Without centrality the network is complete; 
there is a connection between each pair of players. This means that a player’s departure from 
the network has no consequences for the possibilities of the remaining players to interact and 
benefit from each other’s contributions. With centrality, one player connects the other group 
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members. Note, however, that centrality only creates a pivotal role if the player concerned 
could somehow leave or be removed from the network. This would break (some of) the 
connections between other group members. To study the effects of network structures with 
centrality, we therefore include a treatment with exclusion. Here, every player may vote to 
exclude specific group members (as in Cinyabuguma et al. 2005 and Charness and Yang 2014). 
Excluding the central player causes the group to fall apart, which is costly for all involved.1  
Several other experimental studies investigate public good provision in a network. In 
these studies, the network determines which contributions can be accessed (Rosenkranz and 
Weitzel 2012; Charness et al. 2014), who can monitor whom (Eckel et al. 2010; Fatas et al. 
2010), who can punish whom (Leibbrandt et al. 2015) or a combination of these (Carpenter et 
al. 2012). However, none of these studies involves centrality. To the best of our knowledge, 
we are the first to study the effects of network centrality in social dilemmas. 
Our results show that centrality is often used as a license to free ride; central players 
contribute less than others. Other players tolerate such behavior: they contribute more than the 
central player and they tend not to vote to exclude central players. As a result, players with 
centrality earn higher payoffs than others. In other words, we find that central players take 
advantage of their position and manage to get away with this.  
The introduction of players with centrality creates heterogeneity across players. This is 
important, because homogeneity within organizations is unlikely to be found outside the 
laboratory. People differ along many dimensions, including their position in the network. A 
large body of previous work has found that heterogeneity in endowments, productivity and/or 
returns frequently reduces cooperation in VCM games (e.g. Cherry et al. 2005, Anderson et al. 
2008, Tan 2008, Nikiforakis et al. 2012, Fischbacher et al. 2014, Hargreaves Heap et al. 2016, 
Gangadharan et al. 2017).2 This is primarily due to a multiplicity of norms that underlie the 
behavior of players with different characteristics. The introduction of additional features such 
as a punishment mechanism or the activation of group identity allows groups to overcome this 
decrease in cooperation (Reuben and Riedl 2013, Weng and Carlsson 2015). However, not all 
                                                             
1 It is important to note that exclusion is not the only mechanism that might affect the structure of a network. 
Many networks, for example, form endogenously with members joining and leaving at their own discretion. 
Endogenous group formation has been shown to positively affect contributions in experimental public goods 
environments (e.g., Ehrhart and Keser 1999, Coricelli et al. 2004, Page et al. 2005, Gunnthorsdottir et al. 2007, 
Ahn et al. 2008). The changes in network structure that arise from this endogeneity, however, will typically not 
affect players’ centrality; the networks in such experiments are designed to be complete, with every pair of 
members being directly linked. In contrast, our experimental networks either have one central player or have none. 
This provides control over the centrality and allows for clean inferences on the effects of centrality on 
contributions.  
2 Several other papers also study heterogeneity in VCM games but have no baseline with homogenous players. 
Examples include Buckley and Croson (2006), Noussair and Tan (2011) and Dekel et al. (2017).  
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additional mechanisms are equally effective. For example, Gangadharan et al. (2017) find that 
communication increases cooperation in both homogeneous and heterogeneous groups, but the 
positive effect of communication is stronger in homogeneous groups. Finally, not all studies 
find that heterogeneity is detrimental to efficiency, and not under all circumstances. Fisher et 
al. (1995) find that heterogeneity in MPCRs does not affect efficiency and Chan et al. (1999) 
find that heterogeneity in endowments and/or returns from the public good increase 
cooperation in a nonlinear environment. Our study tests the effects of a different kind of 
heterogeneity – that is, in network position – on overall efficiency.  
Our results show that heterogeneity due to centrality does not affect efficiency. In our 
setting, periphery (that is, non-central) players understand the positive value of being connected 
via central players and appear to be willing to pay a price for these connections. Central players 
seem to restrict their free riding to a level that periphery players find acceptable and thereby 
avoid being excluded. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our 
experimental design and section 3 presents our testable hypotheses. We describe our results in 
section 4 and section 5 concludes.  
 
2 Experimental design and procedures 
In the experiment, players are matched in fixed groups of five that interact with each other for 
one block of five rounds. Each session consists of five such blocks, with random re-matching 
between blocks to minimize the possibility of long-term reputation formation. The stage game 
in the baseline is a symmetric linear VCM where players allocate an endowment between a 
private and a common fund. We vary treatments across two dimensions to implement exclusion 
and centrality. The first dimension is whether groups can remove members by majority voting 
(Exclusion) or not (No Exclusion). The second dimension concerns the network structure – 
either every player is linked to each other (No Centrality) or one player connects two separate 
groups (Centrality). The resulting treatments are summarized in Table 1, which also shows the 
treatment labels for, and number of independent observations (matching groups; see below) in 
each treatment. Centrality can only exist if exclusion is possible; if a central player cannot be 
removed from the network, she will always connect the others. The treatment combination no-
exclusion/centrality therefore does not exist.3 
                                                             
3 We also conducted an additional set of treatments where the central player decides on the allocation of the 
surplus created in the VCM games. For more details, see van Leeuwen et al (2015).  
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In all treatments, players are labeled ‘Center’ (C), ‘North’ (N), ‘East’ (E), ‘South’ (S) 
and ‘West’ (W). Only C can be central. We will refer to the other four as ‘periphery players’. 
Each player interacts with all others to whom she is directly or indirectly connected, i.e., players 
in the same network component. Figure 1 presents some possible connections among players 
– a complete network (1a), a network with centrality (1d) and subsequent examples of the 
consequences for the network of excluding a player.  
In each round, players participate in a VCM (e.g., Isaac and Walker 1988). Each player 
𝑖 receives an endowment of 50 points and all players, simultaneously decide how much, 𝑥𝑖 ∈
[0,50], to invest in a common fund. The payoffs for player 𝑖 are given by:  
    𝛱𝑖 = 50 − 𝑥𝑖 + (0.6)(𝑥𝑖 + ∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑗≠𝑖∈𝑁𝑖 ), 
where 𝑁𝑖 denotes the set of players in i’s component and 0.6 is the Marginal Per Capita Return 
(MPCR). In all treatments, players are informed at the end of each round of the individual 
contributions of each other player in their group of five.  
Exclusion  
Our first dimension concerns the possibility for players to exclude others from further 
interaction with the group. In the treatment with no exclusion (nEnC), all five players 
participate in every round. In the other two treatments (EnC and EC), each of the first four 
rounds in a block ends with a voting stage that can lead to one or more players being excluded 
from the group. After having observed others’ decisions in the current round, each non-
excluded player may cast votes, anonymously and at no cost, to exclude any remaining players 
in her component.4 She may cast at most one vote for each player. If a player has received votes 
for exclusion from at least half of the players in her component, she is excluded until the end 
of the block. Hence, in a group of five, a player is excluded if she receives three or more votes, 
                                                             
4 We allow players the option to vote to exclude themselves as well. This was observed in only 6 out of 3,203 
instances of voting.  
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF TREATMENTS 
 No Exclusion Exclusion 
 No Centrality No Centrality Centrality 
Treatment acronym nEnC EnC EC 
Participants N = 85 (n = 6) N = 75 (n = 6) N = 90 (n = 6) 
Notes. New groups in each block are formed from a 10- or 15-person matching group. N is the number of 
subjects and n is the number of independent matching groups. By design the combination of Centrality with 
No Exclusion cannot exist.  
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and in a group of four, two votes suffice. More than one player can be excluded in a round. At 
the end of the round, excluded players are announced as well as the number of votes cast by 
each subject. 
 
If a player is excluded, all her links with other group members are removed. She can 
no longer contribute to, or receive any benefits from, the common fund or vote to exclude 
others. Excluded players only receive a fixed sum –equal to the endowment– in each of the 
remaining rounds. The consequences for the remaining players depend both on the player 
concerned and the network structure.  
Of course, in many organizations outside the laboratory exclusion of a member does 
not require a formal vote. Allowing every member in the group to cast a vote, however, gives 
us an individual measure of how they view the choices made by others. In this way, we elicit 
the preferences and norms that likely underlie many of the formal exclusion processes outside 
the laboratory. 
Network structure – Centrality  
FIGURE 1: NETWORK STRUCTURES 
 
a: No player excluded  b: Periphery player excluded c: Center player excluded 
 
d: No player excluded  e: Periphery player excluded f: Center player excluded 
 
Notes. The top and bottom panel shows the network structure for the cases when there is no centrality and 
when there is centrality, respectively. The three cases per panel distinguish between the network comprising 
of all players, the network without player N and the network(s) without player C. 
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The network structure determines with whom a player interacts. We have two initial network 
structures. The first is a complete network as in Figure 1a where every player is connected to 
every other player and, therefore, no player’s presence is essential to keep the group together. 
If a player is excluded, remaining players are still connected in a group of four, irrespective of 
whether a periphery player (1b) or player C (1c) has been excluded.5 In the treatment without 
centrality (EnC), the remaining players play a four-person VCM.  
 The second is an incomplete network where two pairs of periphery players (N&W and 
S&E) are connected only via C, as in Figure 1d. Centrality occurs because C is necessary to 
keep the two pairs connected to each other. Now, the consequences of removing a player 
depend crucially on her position. If a periphery player is excluded (Figure 1e), the remaining 
four players remain connected. If the player with centrality is excluded (Figure 1f), her absence 
creates two separate groups (N&W and S&E). In this case, the periphery players not only lose 
her future contributions (this also occurs when a periphery player is excluded), but also those 
of the two other periphery players. Thus, excluding the player with centrality is more costly 
than excluding a periphery player. The remaining players play a four-player VCM after 
exclusion of a periphery player and two-player VCMs if C has been excluded.  
Procedures 
The computerized experiment was run in the CREED laboratory of the University of 
Amsterdam. In total 250 subjects drawn from the general student population participated in at 
most one session each. For each treatment, data were collected in 3 sessions, each with 20, 25 
or 30 subjects. Subjects received on-screen instructions and then had to correctly answer a quiz 
in order to proceed.6 Each session lasted approximately one hour. 
Roles (C or periphery) were randomly assigned at the beginning of a session. To avoid 
behavioral spillover effects, these roles remained fixed throughout. In all treatments, subjects’ 
contributions in a round were identified by their position in the network, i.e., North, South, etc. 
To maximize the number of independent observations, re-matching between blocks takes 
places with two matching groups of either 10 or 15 subjects, depending on the number of 
participants in the session. After the experiment, subjects were requested to fill out a short 
demographic questionnaire. 
                                                             
5 We discuss here the situation after the first exclusion. This is presented in Figure 1. The cases for subsequent 
exclusions follow straightforwardly. 
 6 Summaries of the experimental instructions are provided in Appendix A. Full instructions and the test questions 
are provided in Appendix D.  
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At the end of each session, one block was randomly selected and subjects were paid 
their earnings from all rounds within this block. Earnings in points were converted to cash 
using an exchange rate of 60 points to one euro. Subjects earned between 11.40 and 19.50 euro, 
with an average of 16.30 euro, including a show-up fee of 7 euro. 
 
3 Hypotheses 
The stage-game equilibria of these games are straightforward for the case of self-interested 
preferences. Players will not contribute to the common fund across treatments. In the 
experiment, we implement a (finitely) repeated game and we add exclusion in some treatments. 
There are no repeated game equilibria with positive contributions.7 We will use this as the 
benchmark prediction yielding the null hypotheses for our statistical tests. 
If we assume that (some) players have social preferences or if (some) players believe 
that some fraction of the population is willing to exclude free-riders, cooperative repeated game 
equilibria may exist in all treatments. This, however, leads to a plethora of equilibria, 
depending on the specific assumptions. Instead of deriving all equilibria and searching for 
refinements, we derive comparative statics for our treatments using a simple setting with self-
interested and cooperative types a la Kreps et al. (1982). The results of this exercise will serve 
as alternative hypotheses. Details about the two-type model can be found in Appendix B. We 
proceed with presenting the hypotheses that we will test using our experimental data. These 
hypotheses are supported by the two-type model of Appendix B.  
First, we consider the effects of the possibility of exclusion on contribution levels in 
the absence of centrality. Previous evidence shows that the ability to exclude players from the 
group raises contributions (Cinyabuguma et al., 2005). The intuition here is that, without 
exclusion (nEnC), free riders have no incentive to contribute. This yields the following 
hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (effect of exclusion in the absence of centrality):  
The threat of exclusion increases contributions: Contribution levels in nEnC < 
Contribution levels in EnC.  
                                                             
7 In some settings, costless voting could lead to repeated game equilibria with positive contributions (Hirshleifer 
and Rasmusen 1989). However, in our study, excluded players still earn their endowment (which equals the Nash 
stage-game payoff). For this reason, there exists no subgame perfect equilibrium with positive contributions if all 
agents are self-interested. 
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Next, recall that exclusion is a necessary condition for player C to become a player with 
centrality. Thus, for the effects of centrality, we compare situations where groups can exclude 
members in networks without (EnC) or with (EC) a central player. Excluding a free rider 
without centrality (any player in EnC or a periphery player in EC) will not affect expected 
payoffs. Hence, centrality does not change the effects of a threat of exclusion on periphery 
players. Excluding a free rider with centrality does come at a cost, however; players can no 
longer benefit from the contributions by cooperative types connected via the player with 
centrality. This reduces the chances that a free rider with centrality will be excluded, allowing 
her to ‘abuse’ her position. This is summarized in Hypothesis 2. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (effects of centrality):  
(a) Players with centrality contribute less than periphery players: Contribution levels 
by C-players in EC < Contribution levels by periphery players in EC.  
(b) C-players contribute less when they are central: Contribution levels by C-players 
in EC < Contribution levels by C-players in EnC. 
Finally, we consider how the votes to exclude are affected by the treatments. For exclusion to 
work as a disciplining mechanism (Hypothesis 1), players should vote to exclude those with 
low contribution levels. However, players with centrality will be excluded less often.  
 
Hypothesis 3 (voting to exclude):  
(a) Players with higher contributions are less likely to receive votes for exclusion.  
(b) Conditional on contributions, players with centrality are less likely to receive votes 
for exclusion than periphery players. 
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4 Results 
We start with a general overview of our results. Figure 2 presents mean contribution levels per 
round across treatments. For this overview we combine data from all blocks. Table 2 shows 
the mean contribution levels across all rounds and in the first round. Overall, the figure and 
table suggest that contributions are higher with exclusion than without, and that differences in 
cooperation between subject C and the periphery occur only when C has centrality. In what 
follows, we analyze these differences in more detail. Unless stated otherwise, all reported 
statistics come from two-sided permutation t tests using matching groups as the independent 
unit of analysis, and averaging over all rounds and blocks. The number of (independent) 
observations is thus six in each comparison sample (cf. Table 1). Permutation t tests allow for 
testing for differences in means in small samples while the more conventional Mann-Whitney 
and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests test for differences in distributions (see, for example Moir 1998 
and the discussion in Appendix 3 of Schram et al. 2018). Nevertheless, our results and 
conclusions are robust to using Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests instead (see 
Table C.1 in Appendix C).  
FIGURE 2: MEAN CONTRIBUTIONS BY PLAYER POSITION 
 
Notes. For each round, the contribution level is averaged across five blocks. The graphs are based on decisions 
by individuals who have not been excluded from their group and who are not isolated. 
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4.1  Exclusion in the absence of centrality 
Figure 2 shows the usual pattern of declining contribution levels over time in the standard 
public goods game (nEnC) without centrality and exclusion (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000). In 
the absence of exclusion and centrality, the only difference between subjects is one of framing, 
where subject C is presented as being in the ‘middle’ of the group. A one-sample permutation 
t test (henceforth, 1PtT) shows no significant difference in contributions between subjects C 
and periphery subjects in nEnC (1PtT, p = 0.678, n = 6). Thus, we find no evidence of framing 
due to the network representation. 
Once we allow for exclusion (EnC), again no significant differences between subjects 
C and periphery subjects arise (1PtT, p = 0.473, n = 6). For both, we do observe that 
contribution levels increase with respect to nEnC. Two-sample permutation t tests (henceforth, 
2PtT) show that the increase is significant for periphery subjects (2PtT, p = 0.009, n = 12) and 
marginally significant for subject C (2PtT, p = 0.059, n = 12). As a consequence, average 
contribution levels in the group as a whole are higher (2PtT, p = 0.010, n = 12) when exclusion 
is possible. This replicates findings in Cinyabuguma et al. (2005). 
TABLE 2: MEAN CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
No Exclusion Exclusion 
Effect of 
exclusion 
Effect of 
centrality 
 No Centrality No Centrality Centrality (p-values) (p-values) 
 nEnC EnC EC nEnC vs EnC EnC vs EC 
      
All rounds      
All subjects 26.0 (3.8) 35.0 (5.7) 37.8 (2.8) 0.010 0.299 
C-subjects 26.7 (5.6) 34.6 (6.8) 34.7 (4.5) 0.059 0.968 
Periphery 25.9 (3.8) 35.0 (5.5) 38.6 (2.7) 0.009 0.183 
C vs periphery 
(p-value) 
0.678 0.473 0.003 
  
      
First round      
All subjects 32.9 (5.1) 39.3 (4.7) 42.9 (2.7) 0.046 0.127 
C-subjects 34.9 (8.0) 40.2 (6.6) 39.0 (4.0) 0.248 0.698 
Periphery 32.4 (5.7) 39.1 (4.9) 43.9 (2.8) 0.053 0.068 
C vs periphery 
(p-value) 
0.427 0.652 0.001 
  
Notes. Cells give mean contributions across blocks and rounds in points, with standard deviations in 
parentheses. Top panel: entries based on all rounds and blocks, and players that were not excluded or isolated. 
Bottom panel: Entries based on the first round of each block, before any exclusion could occur. P-values come 
from permutation t tests. The unit of analysis is the matching group.  
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Conceivably, these findings could be attributed to selection effects because after round 
1, some subjects might be excluded. To investigate this, we considered only first-round choices 
in every block (see the bottom panel of Table 2). The results are qualitatively similar, though 
the effect of exclusion for periphery players is no longer significant at the 5%-level (p = 0.053). 
 
Result 1 (effects of exclusion): In the absence of centrality, the opportunity to exclude group 
members raises contribution levels of both subject C and periphery subjects.  
 
This result provides direct support for Hypothesis 1. 
 
4.2  The effects of centrality 
Figure 2 shows that in the presence of centrality (EC) there is a difference between contribution 
levels of the subjects with centrality and periphery subjects. Subjects with centrality seem to 
‘abuse’ their position; their contributions are 10 percent lower than those of periphery subjects, 
and this difference is statistically significant (1PtT, p = 0.003, n = 6). Figure 2 and Table 2 
suggest that the introduction of centrality (EnC vs EC) does not affect subjects C’s mean 
contributions across rounds but increases those of periphery subjects. Tests show that the effect 
of centrality on contributions is not significant for both (2PtT, p = 0.968, n = 12 for C-players; 
p = 0.183, n = 12 for the periphery). Once again, the results are qualitatively the same when 
considering only round 1 (cf. bottom panel Table 2). 
 
Result 2 (effects of centrality):  
(a) Contribution levels of subjects with centrality are lower than those of periphery 
subjects.  
(b) Contribution levels of neither subjects with centrality nor periphery subjects are 
significantly affected by introducing centrality.  
 
This result provides support for hypothesis 2(a), but not for 2(b).  
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In treatment EC, we observe lower contributions by subjects with centrality than by those in 
the periphery. To avoid the end effect, we consider only the first four rounds. Then, the average 
difference is 4.6 points per round (43.8 points for periphery subjects versus 39.2 points for C-
subjects). This difference could be driven by a few C-subjects who completely free ride, or by 
many C-subjects who partially free ride. To investigate this, we plot the distributions of 
individual contributions in the first four rounds by treatment and position in Figure 3.  
Figure 3 shows that the difference in contributions between C- and periphery subjects 
is mostly driven by a large number of C-subjects who contribute somewhat less than the 
periphery. In treatment EC, 35% of the C observations are between 40 and 44 points as 
compared to 17% of the periphery observations. At the same time, in EC, C-
subjects contribute between 45 and 50 points in 41% of the observations, while this is the case 
for 66% of the periphery observations. Other contribution levels are rarely observed in EC. All 
in all, though very low contributions (5 points or less) are more frequent among C-subjects 
(6%) than among periphery subjects (2%), the aggregate result of lower contributions by C-
players in EC is mostly driven by those who partially free ride. Note, however, that the 
FIGURE 3: CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
Notes: Histograms of individual contributions in rounds 1-4. The graphs are based on decisions by 
individuals who have not been excluded from their group and who are not isolated. 
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contributions gap resulting from centrality is a diff-in-diff result caused by the combined effects 
for periphery and C-subjects. The effects of centrality are not significant for periphery and C-
subjects separately (see Table 2). 
 
4.3  Voting and exclusion 
Figure 4 presents the cumulative proportion of C subjects and periphery subjects excluded over 
rounds in the exclusion treatments. In both treatments with exclusion, few subjects are 
excluded. In the absence of centrality (EnC), cumulative exclusion rates remain well under 
20% to the end. Further, there is no discernible difference in the rate of exclusion between 
subject C and periphery subjects. With centrality (EC), exclusion rates remain under 20% as 
well and, again, subjects with centrality are not more likely to be excluded than periphery 
subjects. This is remarkable, because the cooperation levels of the former are lower than those 
of the latter (cf. Figure 2). 
FIGURE 4: EXCLUSION BY PLAYER POSITION 
 
Notes: Cumulative exclusion rates for periphery and center subjects. Exclusion rates reflect the mean 
proportion of subjects excluded up to the previous round. Means are taken across all blocks. 
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To further study the exclusion decisions Table 3 presents, for both treatments with 
exclusion, estimates of (multilevel) random effect Probit regressions of the probability of 
receiving a vote for exclusion. The regression estimates the probability that subject j votes to 
exclude subject i as a function of i’s contribution, whether i is located in the C-position, the 
interaction between the latter two, the number of subjects in i and j’s subgroup, and the current 
round and block. We only include observations where i and j could vote for each other, i.e., 
neither should be excluded and they should be connected. We allow for random effects at the 
subject level (of subject j) and the matching group level. To visualize the results, we plot the 
estimated probability that a subject i will receive a vote as a function of contribution levels in 
Figure 5.  
TABLE 3: PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING A VOTE FOR EXCLUSION 
 No Centrality Centrality 
 (EnC) (EC) 
Contribution -0.060*** -0.063*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
C-subject 0.005 -0.729*** 
 (0.169) (0.165) 
C-subject × Contribution -0.000 0.018*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
# subjects in subgroup 0.316*** 0.457*** 
 (0.060) (0.075) 
Round -0.049* 0.096*** 
 (0.028) (0.027) 
Block 0.042* 0.018 
 (0.022) (0.021) 
Constant -1.042** -1.900*** 
 (0.345) (0.395) 
Observations 5,768 6,978 
Pseudo R2 0.273 0.298 
Wald-chi2(6) (p-value) 626.33 724.06 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Chi2(1) test [Contribution + C-subject × 
Contribution] = 0 (p-value) 
173.76 
(0.000) 
137.28 
(0.000) 
Notes: We allow for random effects at the matching group and subject level. Standard errors in parentheses. *, 
** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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In both treatments, there is a strong negative effect of contributions on the probability 
of receiving an exclusion vote (see the contribution variable in Table 3 and the negative slope 
in Figure 5). In addition, the first regression shows that in the absence of centrality (EnC), there 
is no discrimination between roles. The second regression shows that subjects with centrality 
are less likely to receive a vote for exclusion, even after controlling for contribution levels. 
Moreover, the interaction term is positive and significant. Figure 5 illustrates the net effect; for 
low cooperation levels, subjects with centrality are less likely to receive a vote for exclusion 
than periphery subjects. The difference deceases with increasing contribution levels, with the 
probability of an exclusion vote approaching zero. Based on these estimations, a fully free-
riding periphery subject will receive a vote with 73% chance, whereas a fully free-riding C-
subject with centrality will receive a vote with only 46% chance. If no one has yet been 
excluded, the probability of a fully free-riding player being excluded is then 70% for periphery 
players and 26% for player C.  
  
Result 3:  
(a) In both exclusion treatments, there is a negative relation between contribution levels 
and the probability of receiving exclusion votes. 
FIGURE 5. PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING A VOTE FOR EXCLUSION 
 
Notes: Probability of receiving a vote for exclusion as function of contributions for C-subjects and periphery 
subjects. Estimations based on the regressions reported in Table 3. Error bars indicate 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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(b) Controlling for contribution levels, subjects with centrality are less likely to receive 
exclusion votes than periphery subjects. 
 
Together, this provides direct support for Hypotheses 3(a) and 3(b). 
 
4.4 Earnings and efficiency  
Our results show that the possibility of exclusion raises contributions and that subjects with 
centrality contribute less than subjects in the periphery. Our analysis was based on subjects that 
were not excluded or isolated. As excluded players no longer benefit from contributions of 
others and can no longer contribute themselves, the net effect of exclusion and centrality on 
earnings is ambiguous. In this subsection we consider these effects. 
 
Table 4 presents summary statistics for earnings in each treatment, both at the group 
level and for C-subjects and periphery subjects separately.8 All numbers include earnings by 
excluded players. Without centrality, group earnings are higher when exclusion is available, 
but the difference is not statistically significant (nEnC vs EnC: 2PtT, p = 0.112, n = 12). This 
is in spite of the fact that surplus may be lost if subjects are actually excluded. The increase in 
contribution levels thus roughly cancels out the cost of excluding subjects.  
Interestingly, centrality does not lower total earnings. The addition of centrality 
somewhat increases total earnings, though not significantly so (EnC vs EC: 2PtT, p = 0.308, n 
= 12). The same holds if we compare earnings of C-subjects or periphery subjects; for both, 
earnings are not significantly different in EC than in EnC (2PtT, p = 0.140, n = 12 for C-
                                                             
8 In Table C.2 in Appendix C, we also report p-values based on Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests. 
TABLE 4: EARNINGS 
 
No Exclusion Exclusion 
Effect of 
exclusion 
Effect of 
centrality 
 No Centrality No Centrality Centrality (p-values) (p-values) 
 nEnC EnC EC nEnC vs EnC EnC vs EC 
All subjects 102.1 (7.5) 113.6 (14.0) 120.5 (5.2) 0.112 0.308 
C-subjects 101.5 (8.2) 114.0 (14.4) 124.0 (5.6) 0.101 0.140 
Periphery 102.3 (7.6) 113.5 (14.1) 119.6 (5.4) 0.111 0.361 
C vs periphery 
(p-value) 
0.678 0.736 0.001 
  
Notes. Cells give mean earnings per round in points, with standard deviations in parentheses. Entries based on 
all rounds and blocks, and all subjects, regardless of being excluded or isolated. P-values come from 
permutation t tests. The unit of analysis is the matching group.  
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subjects and p = 0.361, n = 12 for periphery subjects). With centrality, C-subjects do earn 
significantly more than periphery subjects (EC: 1PtT, p = 0.001, n = 6), which is not the case 
in the two treatments without centrality (nEnC: 1PtT , p = 0.678, n = 6; EnC: 1PtT , p = 0. 736, 
n = 6).  
All in all, we conclude that centrality has no negative effect on efficiency. Centrality, 
however, comes at the cost of increased inequality between the central player and those in the 
periphery. 
 
5 Concluding remarks 
We study how network structure and positions –in particular, the presence of centrality– affect 
cooperative behavior in a VCM setting. Centrality is a valuable position to hold because 
exclusion of a central player is costly to other players, who stand to lose access to substantial 
parts of the network. Our experiment is the first to provide a controlled test of the effects of 
centrality. We find clear evidence that central players ‘abuse’ their position by contributing 
less than the periphery, but that this only increases inequality, without a negative effect on 
group efficiency.  
Our results are important because –as argued in the introduction– central positions can 
appear in many networks, especially in informal organizations. Similarly, exclusion of 
members is a possibility in many organizations. The previous literature (e.g., Cinyabuguma et 
al. 2005) has seen exclusion as a mechanism by which cooperation norms can be enforced. Our 
results show that such norms are not set in stone. Periphery players are affected differently by 
exclusion than those who are central. This asymmetric enforcement of norms has, to the best 
of our knowledge, not been observed before. 
Interestingly, central players only free ride slightly more than those without this 
position. Although the contributions (earnings) of central players are significantly lower 
(higher) than the contributions (earnings) of periphery players, the differences are relatively 
small. We find that the earnings of central players are on average only 3.7% higher than the 
earnings of periphery players. Whether this reflects an accurate estimate of the extent of free 
riding that is deemed acceptable by periphery players is at this stage an open question. Central 
players might have correct expectations about the norm that the periphery is willing to enforce 
(that is, further reduction in contributions would lead to exclusion) or might be too cautious, 
leaving opportunities for further free riding on the table. Our experiment was not designed to 
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investigate the extent to which central players are best responding to the periphery’s exclusion 
strategies, but this is certainly an interesting avenue for future research.  
Other interesting extensions would further increase the generalizability of our findings. 
For example, subjects in our design are randomly allocated to central or periphery positions, 
which could reduce the legitimacy of free riding by a central player. Central positions outside 
the laboratory are seldom randomly obtained. If such a position is somehow ‘earned’, then both 
the player concerned and the periphery might find free riding (even) more acceptable. One 
could add entitlement to positions to our design to investigate this. Alternatively, individuals 
in a central position might have higher self-image concerns (Bénabou and Tirole 2006) than 
those in the periphery, for example because they feel a sense of responsibility for keeping the 
network together. If so, this might decrease their tendency to free ride. One could add measures 
of self-image and responsibility to our design to investigate this possibility. 
The take away from our study is that even with random assignment and anonymous 
positions in the network, players with a central position partially free ride, and that this is 
tolerated by players in the periphery. 
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ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL (ONLINE ONLY) 
 
Appendix A: Summary of the experimental instructions 
Below are the summaries of the instructions as it was handed out to the participants in the 
experiment. Full instructions for all treatments are available in Appendix D. Each paragraph 
that was included only in some treatments starts with <treatment acronym>. 
 
Summary of instructions 
Welcome to this experiment on decision-making. You will be paid € 7 for your participation 
plus whatever you earn in the experiment. 
 
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate. If you have any questions at any 
time, please raise your hand. An experimenter will assist you privately. You will record your 
decisions privately and anonymously at your computer terminal. Other participants will never 
be able to link you with your personal decisions or earnings from the experiment.  
 
During the experiment, all earnings are denoted in points. At the end of the experiment, your 
earnings will be converted to euros at the rate: 60 points = € 1.  
 
The experiment consists of 5 blocks. Each block consists of 5 rounds. At the end of the 
experiment, one block will be randomly selected and everyone will be paid for their decisions 
in that block. 
 
The composition of the groups will remain the same for the 5 rounds in a block. At the end of 
a block, participants will randomly be divided into new groups of five. 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, each participant will randomly be assigned a position - 
North (N), East (E), South (S), West (W) or Center (C). These positions will remain fixed 
throughout the experiment. For example, if you are assigned the North position, you will be 
in the north position in each round in each block of the experiment. 
 
At the beginning of each round, each participant receives an endowment of 50 points. You 
decide on how much of this endowment to invest in each of two accounts. These are called a 
"private account" and a "group account". You may invest everything in the private account, 
everything in the group account, or any combination of the two, as long as you invest 50 points 
in total.  
Your earnings include earnings both from your private account and the group account: 
 
 Earnings from your private account: You will earn 1 point for each point invested 
in your private account. 
 Earnings from the group account: Your earnings from the group account are based 
on the total number of points invested in the group account by all members in your 
group. Each group member will earn 0.6 points for each point in the group account 
regardless of who made the investment. 
 
<EnC, EC> Exclusion of a member means that this player can no longer invest in the group 
account and will not receive any earnings from the group account in the remaining 
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rounds. The excluded participant will receive an endowment of 50 points in each of the 
remaining rounds in the block. All 50 points will automatically be invested in the private 
account.  
 
<EnC, EC> To decide on who will be excluded, the group members will select candidates for 
exclusion. 
 
<EnC, EC> You can indicate for each member of your (sub-)group whether or not you 
think that s/he should be excluded from the group in future rounds in the current block. You 
can vote for as many or as few participants as you want.  
 
<EnC, EC> If some member(s) of the group have previously been excluded, you can only vote 
on excluding members of the sub-group you are in. Participants who previously have been 
excluded cannot vote for the exclusion of others. 
 
<EnC, EC> If half or more members of the (sub-)group vote to exclude a participant, that 
participant will be excluded in future rounds in the current block. 
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Appendix B: Two-type model 
We study a simple model with cooperative types (similar to Kreps et al. 1982) to derive 
comparative statics for the effects of exclusion and centrality. We assume that there are two 
types of players: strategic self-interested types and cooperative types. Self-interested types 
maximize their own payoffs. Cooperative types unconditionally cooperate (contribute the 
entire endowment) and also vote to exclude anyone who does not (if exclusion is possible). 
This type of behavior is consistent with ‘homo moralis’ preferences described by Alger and 
Weibull (2013). See Miettinen et al. (2017) for evidence that behavior in a sequential prisoners’ 
dilemma is largely consistent with such preferences.  
 
Players with homo moralis preferences maximize a convex combination of self-interest and 
moral preferences. Moral preferences entail maximizing payoffs conditional on everyone else 
acting the same, i.e. a player with these preferences maximizes the following utility function: 
 
𝑢(𝑥, 𝐲) = (1 − 𝜅) ⋅ 𝜋(𝑥, 𝐲) + 𝜅𝜋(𝑥, 𝐱), 
 
where 𝜋(𝑥, 𝐲) denotes the monetary payoff of playing strategy 𝑥 when all others play strategies 
𝐲 . The parameter 𝜅 ∈ [0,1]  is the degree of morality and 𝜋(𝑥, 𝐱) the monetary payoff of 
playing strategy 𝑥 if all others would use the same strategy 𝑥. In our games, the assumed 
strategy of cooperative types maximizes these payoffs for any player with high enough 
morality. For 𝜅 = 1, it follows directly from 𝑢(𝑥, 𝐲) = 𝜋(𝑥, 𝐱) = 50 − 𝑥 + 0.6 ∗ 5 ∗ 𝑥  that 
without exclusion, utility is maximized in any round by choosing 𝑥 = 50. Across T rounds, 
utility is then 150T. For 𝜅 < 1 full contribution is still utility maximizing as long as not too 
many others act selfishly (so that the earnings lost to the selfish others is outweighed by the 
morality term). When 𝜅 = 1 , the complete strategy of full contribution in T rounds and 
exclusion of free riders again yields utility equal to 𝜋(50, 𝟓𝟎) = 150𝑇. We conclude that these 
moral types’ preferences are consistent with the behavior assumed for the cooperative types in 
our model.  
 
The proportion of cooperative types is given by p, which we assume to be a minority, i.e. 𝑝 ∈
[0,0.4). The upper bound on p assumes that a plausible fraction of at most 40% of the players 
are unconditional co-operators. In similar environments, Fischbacher et al. (2001) have shown 
that even the number of conditional co-operators remains below half of the subjects. There are 
even fewer unconditional cooperators.  
 
We are interested in the range of 𝑝 where self-interested types will act cooperatively on the 
equilibrium path. More precisely, we study the range of 𝑝 under which a subgame-perfect Nash 
equilibrium can be constructed where self-interested types fully contribute until (and including) 
the penultimate round. Clearly, there are many other equilibria possible, involving various 
levels of contribution. For the sake of simplicity, we focus on full cooperation up until (and 
including) the penultimate period. To start, note that in all treatments, in the final round, self-
interested players will simply play according to the stage-game Nash equilibrium and 
contribute nothing.  
 
No Exclusion and No Centrality (nEnC) 
Without exclusion, self-interested players will not cooperate in the penultimate round, as there 
is no mechanism through which cooperative behavior can be enforced. This is independent of 
the proportion of cooperative types 𝑝 . So, for no value of 𝑝  will self-interested types act 
cooperatively in the penultimate round, or –by backward induction– in any preceding round. 
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Exclusion and No Centrality (EnC) 
In this case, the following strategy (followed by the self-interested types) is part of a subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium: 
 
- All self-interested players fully contribute in any round 𝑡 <  𝑇, and contribute nothing 
in round 𝑇. 
- All players vote to exclude any player who did not fully contribute in previous rounds 
and do not vote to exclude any player who always fully contributed. 
 
Note that in this case, self-interested players are indifferent about voting to exclude players that 
do not act cooperatively, as excluding a free rider is costless. Moreover, self-interested players 
will not vote to exclude players that act cooperatively as doing so is costly in expectation if 
𝑝 > 0. Cooperative types vote to exclude free riders by assumption. Hence, a strategy profile 
where free riders are excluded and cooperators are not, may be part of an equilibrium. This 
means that in any round 𝑡 < 𝑇, a self-interested player will act cooperatively if the payoff from 
acting cooperatively until and including the penultimate round plus free riding in the final 
round (and assuming other self-interested players will do the same) exceeds the payoff from 
deviating in the current round and being subsequently excluded. Assume this deviation takes 
place in round t. then the condition reads: 
 
(𝑇 − 𝑡)(0.6(5 ⋅ 50)) + (50 + 0.6(4 ⋅ 50𝑝)) ≥ 50 + 0.6(4 ⋅ 50) + (𝑇 − 𝑡)50, 
 
holds. Rewriting this condition yields: 
𝑝 ≥ 1 −
5
6
(𝑇 − 𝑡). 
 
Note that if this condition holds for 𝑡 = 𝑇 − 1, it will also hold for all preceding rounds. For 
𝑡 = 𝑇 − 1, this gives 𝑝 ≥
1
6
. Hence, for any 𝑝 ≥
1
6
 full cooperation up until the penultimate 
round can be supported as a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. As previous work by 
Cinyabuguma et al. (2005) found that the threat of exclusion increases contributions, we will 
assume that 𝑝 ≥
1
6
 from now on. 
 
Exclusion and Centrality (EC) 
In this case, we consider the following two strategy profiles (for self-interested types) as 
candidates for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium: 
 
Candidate 1 (full contributions by both periphery and C-players) 
- All players fully contribute in any round 𝑡 < 𝑇 and contribute nothing in round T. 
- All players vote to exclude any player who did not fully contribute in previous rounds 
and do not vote to exclude any player who always fully contributed. 
 
Candidate 2 (full contributions by periphery players only) 
- All periphery players fully contribute in any round 𝑡 < 𝑇 and contribute nothing in 
round T. 
- All periphery players vote to exclude any periphery player who did not fully contribute 
in previous rounds and do not vote to exclude a periphery player who always fully 
contributed. Periphery players never vote to exclude the C-player. 
- The C-player contributes nothing in any round 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇.  
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- The C-player votes to exclude any periphery player who did not fully contribute in 
previous rounds and does not vote to exclude a periphery player who always fully 
contributed. The C-player never votes to exclude herself. 
 
Excluding an uncooperative periphery player will not affect expected payoffs in future rounds. 
Excluding an uncooperative player with centrality, however, comes at a cost; one can no longer 
benefit from the contributions by cooperative types who were connected only via C. Hence, 
self-interested periphery players will not be willing to exclude an uncooperative player with 
centrality for any 𝑝 >  0. This means that free-riding center players will only be excluded if 
there are three or more cooperative types among the periphery players (because a majority of 
votes is needed), which happens with probability 𝑞 = 𝑝4 + 4𝑝3(1 − 𝑝) . A self-interested 
center player will then free ride if there are not too many cooperative types around (in 
expectation). Precisely, a self-interested center player will free ride in any round 𝑡 < 𝑇 if: 
 
(𝑇 − 𝑡)(0.6(5 ⋅ 50)) + (50 + 0.6(4 ⋅ 50𝑝))
≤ (1 − 𝑞) ((𝑇 − 𝑡)(50 + 0.6(4 ⋅ 50)) + (50 + 0.6(4 ⋅ 50𝑝)))
+ 𝑞 ((50 + 0.6(4 ⋅ 50)) + (𝑇 − 𝑡)50). 
 
Rewriting gives: 
 
𝑞((𝑇 − 𝑡) + 𝑝 − 1) ≤
1
6
(𝑇 − 𝑡). 
 
For our experimental parameter 𝑇 = 5, this holds for any 𝑡 < 𝑇 as long as 𝑝 ≤ 0.4. Hence, if 
𝑝 ≤ 0.4, Candidate 1 cannot be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 
 
Next consider Candidate 2. After the first round, periphery players will learn whether the center 
player is a cooperative type or not. First, consider the case where the center turns out to be self-
interested, and has not been excluded. Note that if the center acts uncooperatively, all self-
interested players will be revealed to be self-interested, as after each round the number of votes 
cast for exclusion by each player is revealed to all. Hence, after round 𝑡 = 1, it is common 
knowledge who is a self-interested type or not. There are three sub-cases: with two, three, or 
four self-interested periphery players (if there were only one self-interested periphery player, 
an uncooperative center would be excluded). With 𝑦  cooperative types, and 4 − 𝑦  self-
interested players in the periphery, a self-interested periphery player will fully contribute if: 
 
(𝑇 − 𝑡)(0.6(4 ⋅ 50)) + (50 + 0.6 ⋅ 50𝑦) ≥ 50 + 0.6(3 ⋅ 50) + (𝑇 − 𝑡)50, 
(𝑇 − 𝑡)70 ≥ 90 − 30𝑦, 
 
which holds for any round 1 < 𝑡 < 𝑇, as long as 𝑦 ≥ 1, i.e. as long as there is at least one 
cooperative type in the periphery.  
 
Second, consider the case that the center turned out to be self-interested and has been 
excluded. This immediately implies that there is at most one self-interested type in the 
periphery. Then, in any round 1 < 𝑡 < 𝑇, this self-interested periphery player will fully 
contribute if: 
 
(𝑇 − 𝑡)(0.6(2 ⋅ 50)) + (50 + 0.6 ⋅ 50) ≥ 50 + 0.6 ⋅ 50 + (𝑇 − 𝑡)50, 
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(𝑇 − 𝑡)(10) ≥ 0. 
 
which holds for any 1 < 𝑡 < 𝑇. 
 
Next, consider the case where the center turns out to be a cooperative type. In this case, a 
self-interested periphery player will contribute in any round 1 < 𝑡 < 𝑇 if: 
 
(𝑇 − 𝑡)(0.6(5 ⋅ 50)) + (50 + 0.6(50 + 3 ⋅ 50𝑝)) ≥ 50 + 0.6(4 ⋅ 50) + (𝑇 − 𝑡)50, 
 
holds. Rewriting this condition yields: 
𝑝 ≥ 1 −
10
9
(𝑇 − 𝑡), 
 
which clearly holds for any 𝑝 ≥ 0. 
 
It only remains to consider the first round, where it is still unclear whether the center player is 
a cooperative type or not. In this round, a self-interested periphery player will fully contribute 
if: 
 
𝑝 ((𝑇 − 1)(0.6(5 ⋅ 50)) + (50 + 0.6(50 + 3 ⋅ 50𝑝)))
+ (1 − 𝑝) ((1 − 𝑝)3(0.6(4 ⋅ 50) + (𝑇 − 1)50)
+ (1 − (1 − 𝑝)3) ((𝑇 − 1)(0.6(4 ⋅ 50)) + (50 + 0.6(3 ⋅ 50𝑝))))
≥ 𝑝(50 + 0.6(4 ⋅ 50) + (𝑇 − 1)50)
+ (1 − 𝑝)(50 + 0.6(3 ⋅ 50) + (𝑇 − 1)50), 
 
𝑝((𝑇 − 1)150 + (80 + 90𝑝))
+ (1 − 𝑝)((𝑇 − 1)120 + (50 + 90𝑝)
+ (1 − 𝑝)3(70 − 90𝑝 + (𝑇 − 1)(−70)) ≥ 140 + (𝑇 − 1)50 + 30𝑝, 
 
holds. Solving yields that for 𝑇 = 5 this holds for any 𝑝 ≥ 0.022.  
 
In sum, for 1/6 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 0.4 no subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists in treatment EC where 
all players (including C) fully contribute in the first 𝑇 − 1 rounds. However, a subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium where all periphery players fully contribute in the first 𝑇 − 1 rounds, and 
where the center free-rides can be supported for 0.022 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 0.4. Note that for the case where 
all 5 players turn out be self-interested, no such equilibrium exists, which happens with a 
probability of (1 − 𝑝)5.9  
 
Our hypotheses for the experiment are supported by the model. For 1/6 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 0.4 , full 
cooperation cannot be part of an SPNE for all players in nEnC and C-players in EC. It can be 
supported for periphery and C-players in EnC, and for periphery players in EC. 
                                                             
9 For simplicity, we omitted the condition that strategy profile `Candidate 2’ should include that self-interested 
periphery players should only contribute if not all others have been revealed to be self-interested. 
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Appendix C: Tests based on Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon signed-ranks 
tests 
 
 
TABLE C.1: MEAN CONTRIBUTIONS, MANN-WHITNEY TESTS & WILCOXON SIGNED-RANKS TESTS 
 
No Exclusion Exclusion  
Effect of 
exclusion 
Effect of 
centrality 
 No Centrality No Centrality Centrality (p-values) (p-values) 
 nEnC EnC EC nEnC vs EnC EnC vs EC 
      
All rounds      
All subjects 26.0 (3.8) 35.0 (5.7) 37.8 (2.8) 0.010 0.262 
C-subjects 26.7 (5.6) 34.6 (6.8) 34.7 (4.5) 0.078 0.873 
Periphery 25.9 (3.8) 35.0 (5.5) 38.6 (2.7) 0.016 0.262 
C vs periphery 
(p-value) 
0.463 0.463 0.028 
  
      
First round      
All subjects 32.9 (5.1) 39.3 (4.7) 42.9 (2.7) 0.078 0.078 
C-subjects 34.9 (8.0) 40.2 (6.6) 39.0 (4.0) 0.262 0.936 
Periphery 32.4 (5.7) 39.1 (4.9) 43.9 (2.8) 0.055 0.055 
C vs periphery 
(p-value) 
0.463 0.600 0.028 
  
Notes. Cells give mean contributions across blocks and rounds in points, with standard deviations in 
parentheses. Top panel: Entries based on all rounds and blocks, and players that were not excluded or isolated. 
Bottom panel: Entries based on the first round of each block, hence before any exclusion could occur. P-values 
comparing treatments come from (two-sided) Mann-Whitney tests and p-values comparing C vs periphery 
players come from (two-sided) Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests. The unit of analysis is the matching group.  
 
TABLE C.2: EARNINGS, MANN-WHITNEY TESTS & WILCOXON SIGNED-RANKS TESTS 
 
No Exclusion Exclusion  
Effect of 
exclusion 
Effect of 
centrality 
 No Centrality No Centrality Centrality (p-values) (p-values) 
 nEnC EnC EC nEnC vs EnC EnC vs EC 
All subjects 102.1 (7.5) 113.6 (14.0) 120.5 (5.2) 0.078 0.150 
C-subjects 101.5 (8.2) 114.0 (14.4) 124.0 (5.6) 0.037 0.150 
Periphery 102.3 (7.6) 113.5 (14.1) 119.6 (5.4) 0.109 0.200 
C vs periphery 
(p-value) 
0.463 0.917 0.028 
  
Notes. Cells give mean earnings per round in points, with standard deviations in parentheses. Entries based on 
all rounds and blocks, and all subjects, regardless of being excluded or isolated. P-values comparing treatments 
come from (two-sided) Mann-Whitney tests and p-values comparing C vs periphery players come from (two-
sided) Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests. The unit of analysis is the matching group. 
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Appendix D: Full instructions 
Below are the transcripts of the instructions and test questions in the experiment. Each 
paragraph that was included only in some treatments starts with <treatment acronym(s)>. In 
the second set of test questions, all the numbers were randomly and independently generated 
for each participant. 
 
Welcome 
Welcome to this experiment on decision-making. You will be paid € 7 for your participation 
plus whatever you earn in the experiment. 
 
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate. If you have any questions at any 
time, please raise your hand. An experimenter will assist you privately. You will record your 
decisions privately and anonymously at your computer terminal. Other participants will never 
be able to link you with your personal decisions or earnings from the experiment.  
 
These instructions will explain what you may do in this experiment. If you follow them 
carefully, you may make a substantial amount of money. How much you make depends on 
your decisions and the decisions of other participants. Your earnings will be paid to you 
privately at the end of today's session. 
 
During the experiment, all earnings are denoted in points. At the end of the experiment, your 
earnings will be converted to euros at the rate: 60 points = € 1. 
 
<nEnC> These instructions are given in 4 pages like this one. While reading them, you will be 
able to page back and forth by clicking "next page" or "previous page" at the bottom of your 
screen, or by using the menu on top of the screen. The page may be larger than fits on your 
screen. In those cases, you can use the scroll bar to move down the page. 
 
<EnC, EC> These instructions are given in 6 pages like this one. While reading them, you will 
be able to page back and forth by clicking "next page" or "previous page" at the bottom of your 
screen, or by using the menu on top of the screen. The page may be larger than fits on your 
screen. In those cases, you can use the scroll bar to move down the page. 
 
Blocks, Rounds and Positions 
The experiment consists of 5 blocks. Each block consists of 5 rounds. At the end of the 
experiment, one block will be randomly selected and everyone will be paid for their decisions 
in that block. 
 
The composition of the groups will remain the same for the 5 rounds in a block. At the end 
of a block, participants will randomly be divided into new groups of five. 
 
Each of the five individuals in a group has a 'position'. We call these the North (N), East (E), 
South (S), West (W) and Center (C) positions. These are shown in the following figure. We 
will explain later how the positions are connected to each other. 
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<nEnC, EC> 
 
 
<EnC> 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, each participant will randomly be assigned a position - 
North (N), East (E), South (S), West (W) or Center (C). These positions will remain fixed 
throughout the experiment. For example, if you are assigned the North position, you will be 
in the north position in each round in each block of the experiment. 
 
Thus, while there will always be one participant in each position in your group, the participants 
occupying other positions will change from one block to the next (and remain the same in the 
5 rounds of any single block). 
 
Investment Decision 
<nEnC> In each round of every block, you will be asked to make one decision. We will now 
describe this decision. 
 
<EnC, EC> In each round of every block, you will be asked to make either one or two 
decisions. Here, we describe the first. Whether or not you need to make a second decision, and 
what this means, will be explained shortly. 
 
At the beginning of each round, each participant receives an endowment of 50 points. This 
endowment will be the same in each round and for every participant. Your decision is on how 
much of this endowment to invest in each of two accounts. These are called a "private 
account" and a "group account". You must invest your complete endowment in these two 
accounts. This means that every point must be invested in either the private account or the 
group account. It is completely up to you how much you want to invest in either of the two. 
You may invest everything in the private account, everything in the group account, or any 
combination of the two, as long as you invest 50 points in total. 
 
After everyone has made their investment decisions, you will be informed of the investment 
decisions of each of the participants in your group and your earnings in this round. These 
earnings include earnings both from your private account and the group account. 
 
 Earnings from your private account: You will earn 1 point for each point invested 
in your private account. 
 Earnings from the group account: Your earnings from the group account are based on 
the total number of points invested in the group account by all members in your group. 
Each group member will earn 0.6 points for each point in the group account 
regardless of who made the investment. 
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Your earnings from earlier rounds cannot be carried over to use in the following rounds. 
You will receive a new endowment in each round. The same process will be repeated for a total 
of 5 rounds each in each of the 5 blocks. 
 
<EnC, EC> Exclusion of a Group Member 
<EnC, EC> The second decision you may be asked to make is whether to exclude other 
players from your group for the remainder of the block. We will explain shortly how players 
may be excluded. First, we explain what exclusion means. 
 
<EnC, EC> Exclusion of a member means that this player can no longer invest in the group 
account and will not receive any earnings from the group account in the remaining 
rounds. The excluded participant will receive an endowment of 50 points in each of the 
remaining rounds in the block. All 50 points will automatically be invested in the private 
account. Thus, the excluded participant will earn 50 points in each of the remaining rounds in 
the current block. 
 
<EnC, EC> We can indicate exclusion of a member by deleting the lines connecting this player 
to other group members. As an example, the following figure shows the case where player N 
has been excluded. 
 
<EnC> 
 
 
<EC> 
 
 
<EnC> Note that after exclusion of N, a group of four remains, that can invest in a joint group 
account. These four players form a sub-group. All participants in your sub-group are indicated 
by a green circle, excluded participants are indicated by a red circle and participants in another 
subgroup by an orange circle. The round will continue like before with the exception that the 
excluded participant cannot invest any points in the group account.  
If you are not N, your group account earnings will be 0.6 x (points invested in the group account 
by W, C, E, and S). The same holds if not N, but W, E, S or C is excluded. 
 
<EC> Note that after exclusion of N, a group of four remains, that can invest in a joint group 
account. These four players form a sub-group. All participants in your sub-group are indicated 
by a green circle, excluded participants are indicated by a red circle and participants in another 
subgroup by an orange circle. The round will continue like before with the exception that the 
excluded participant cannot invest any points in the group account. If you are not N, your group 
account earnings will be 0.6 x (points invested in the group account by W, C, E, and S). The 
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same holds if not N, but W, E, or S is excluded. If C is excluded, this is different however. In 
this case, the following case is obtained: 
 
<EnC> 
 
 
<EC> 
 
 
<EC> This shows that exclusion of C leaves two separate sub-groups within your group: 
 participants in the North (N) and West (W) positions 
 participants in the South (S) and East (E) positions. 
 
<EC> Earnings from the group account will depend on the total points invested in the group 
by participants in your sub-group alone. You will earn 0.6 points for each point invested by 
the two participants (including you) in your sub-group. For instance, if you are in the North 
position, your earnings from the group account will be 0.6 x (points invested in the group 
account by you and the participant in the West position). Similarly, if you are in the South 
position, your group account earnings depend on the group account investments of yourself 
and the East participant. You will not earn anything from the group account investments 
of the participants in the other sub-group. Note again that the Center participant cannot 
invest any points in the group account if excluded. 
 
<EnC, EC> The Exclusion Decision 
<EnC, EC> To decide on who will be excluded, the group members will select candidates for 
exclusion. 
 
<EnC, EC> You can indicate for each member of your (sub-)group whether or not you 
think that s/he should be excluded from the group in future rounds in the current block. After 
you have been informed about the others' investment decisions in a round, you will be given 
the following list. 
 
<EnC, EC> 
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<EnC, EC> When deciding, you will have access to all previous investment decisions in the 
current block by the players. You can register your vote to exclude a participant by clicking 
the button next to that participant's position. If you do not want to exclude a participant, 
leave the button unselected. In this example, we have selected all as candidates, but all buttons 
will be unselected before you decide. You can change your mind by clicking the button again. 
You can vote for as many or as few participants as you want. When you finish voting, click the 
Continue button. 
 
<EnC, EC> If some member(s) of the group have previously been excluded, you can only vote 
on excluding members of the sub-group you are in. Participants who previously have been 
excluded cannot vote for the exclusion of others. 
 
<EnC, EC> If half or more members of the (sub-)group vote to exclude a participant, that 
participant will be excluded in future rounds in the current block.  
 
<EnC, EC> After all individuals have made their decisions on exclusion, you will be informed 
of the result of the voting and which participants, if any, are excluded. Specifically, you will 
be informed about: (i) which members have been excluded (if any); and (ii) for each member, 
how many other members s/he voted to exclude. 
 
End of the Instructions 
You have now reached the end of these instructions. You still have a chance to go back and re-
read parts, if you like. 
 
Once you are satisfied that you have fully understood the instructions, you may indicate this 
by clicking the 'Ready' button at the bottom of this screen. 
 
After you have indicated that you are ready, we will ask you a few questions regarding the 
decisions you will make in the experiment. These questions will help you check whether you 
have understood the instructions and will also help to understand the calculation of your 
earnings. Once everyone has answered all questions correctly we will begin the experiment. 
 
Quiz Questions I 
Before the experiment starts, we will ask you some questions to check your understanding. 
You can go back to the instructions by clicking on the menu at the top of the screen. 
   
Fill in the blanks: 
This experiment consists of ___ blocks and each block consists of ___ rounds. This means that 
there are in total ___ blocks and ___ rounds in this experiment. 
 
Your group of five participants:  
o Is the same in all blocks and all rounds 
o Changes every block 
o Changes every round 
 
Your position: 
o Is the same in all blocks and all rounds 
o Changes every block 
o Changes every round 
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<EnC, EC> If you are excluded, you will remain excluded until: 
o The end of the experiment 
o The end of the block 
o The end of the round 
 
Quiz Questions II 
In the figures and tables below two possible outcomes of a round are given. These figures and 
tables serve only as an example: they are not informative on how you should decide in the 
experiment. 
 
Suppose that you are in the North position in both situations. What would be your earnings in 
each situation? 
 
<nEnC> 
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<EnC>
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<EC> 
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